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assumption of risk in all cases except those of express consent.3' There-
fore, the only similar alternative would be contributory negligence.
However, under the comparative negligence statute32 contributory
negligence is no longer a complete bar to recovery, but must be com-
pared with the negligence of the defendant.33 But how can fault be com-
pared with non-fault? The defense of contributory negligence is only
applied when the defendant, as well as the plaintiff, has been negli-
gent.34 Yet, at the same time, justice demands that a plaintiff should
be barred from recovery when he has proceeded willfully or negligently
to use a product and suffered injury, after he has discovered the defect
and is aware of the danger. It is interesting to ponder how Wisconsin
would solve this problem.
In summation, the advent of strict liability has come upon the
courts very rapidly, and more decisions can be expected in the near
future. Dean Prosser has stated that "with the exception of the change
in the law with respect to prenatal injuries, this is the most radical and
spectacular development in tort law during this century." 35 Yet, strict
liability is not a panacea. In reality, it probably raises as many prob-
lems as it solves. The assuagement, however, lies in the fact that strict
liability in tort stands a good chance of being uniformly adopted by
the courts. Universal agreement on a single theory of liability will serve
to ameliorate and mollify the existing confusion resulting from a
multitudinous variety of bases on which liability is currently founded.
MICHAEL W. Wmcox
Sales: Uniform Commercial Code: Section 2-318 and Its Effect
on the Requirement of Privity-Plaintiff, employed as manager of a
hotel, personally purchased from a state liquor store, on behalf of his
employer, four bottles of champagne produced and bottled by the de-
fendant corporation. The wine was intended for use and consumption
by the guests of the hotel. While plaintiff and other employees were
preparing to serve the wine, a cap from one suddenly ejected and hit
the plaintiff in the eye, resulting in a serious injury. The trial court
determined that the suit was barred because of lack of privity between
the parties. On appeal, in Yengtzer v. Taylor Wine Co.,: the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that the employee was a buyer under sec-
s'McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W. 2d 14
(1962) (host to guest in automobile), extended to all situations involving "tacit
assumption of risk" in Gilson v. Drees Bros., 19 Wis. 2d 107, 120 N.W. 2d 63(1959).
32 WIs. STAT. §331.045 (1961).
33 Nelson v. Hanson, 10 Wis. 2d 107, 102 N.W. 2d 251 (1959).
34RESTATEMENT, TORTS §467 (1934).
3 5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), ToRTs, Note to Institute §402a (Tent. Draft No. 10,
1964).
1414 Pa. 272, 199 A. 2d 463 (1964).
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tion 2-318,2 as defined by section 2-1033 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
To recover damages caused by a defective product, a plaintiff must
base his claim on either breach of warranty or negligence. The negli-
gence approach has been rid of the requirement of privity traditional
to warranty actions,4 but, in general, still places a heavy burden of proof
upon the plaintiff. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has provided only
minimal assistance in meeting the problem of proof of negligence be-
cause a plaintiff must show control of the instrumentality of injury
by the defendant. 5 As a result many courts have adopted a doctrine of
strict liability in tort for all manufactured products, 6 but such a theory
was not pursued in the principal case.
Because of the evidentiary difficulties involved in applying the
negligence theory, the principal case was submitted on a theory of
breach of warranty and hence was governed by the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, particularly section 2-318 thereof which designates the
categories of persons to whom sales warranties are deemed to run.
In analyzing section 2-318, it is important to first distinguish the
two types of privity significant in every warranty action. Vertical
privity is the relationship of purchasers and sellers in the commercial
chain of distribution, while horizontal privity is the further relationship
of a seller with a person using the product who has come into posses-
sion or control after the last sale has been made.
Section 2-318 of the recently adopted Uniform Commercial Code
is significant only as to its impact on horizontal privity. The draftsmen
of the Code limited its scope of protection only to members of the
family, household, and household guests personally injured, and not
to other reasonably forseeable victims. To be entitled under this pro-
2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-318: "Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties
Express or Implied. A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends
to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who
is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use,
consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the
warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section."
3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-103: "Definitions and Index of Definitions.
(1) Buyer means a person who buys or contracts to buy goods.
(b) Good Faith in the case of the merchant means honesty in fact and ob-
servance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.
(c) Receipt of goods means taking physical possession of them.
(d) Seller means a person who sells or contracts to sell goods."
4 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 110 N.E. 1050 (1916) ; Smith
v. Atco, 6 Wis. 2d 356, 94 N.W. 2d 697 (1959); Dunn v. Ralston Purina Co.,
38 Tenn. App. 229, 272 S.W. 2d 479 (1954); Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319
Mass. 372, 64 N.E. 2d 693 (1946); Babylon v. Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 138
A. 2d 375 (1958).
5 PRoSSER, TORTS §42 (1955); Ghiardi, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Wisconsin, 39
MARQ. L. REv. 361 (1955).6 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. App. 2d 67, 377 P. 2d 897 (1962);
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp. 12 N.Y. 2d 432, 191 N.E. 2d 81 (1963);
RESTATEMENT, ToRrs §402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
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vision to rely upon warranties which a buyer receives from his seller,
the injured party must establish
(a) that he is a natural person;
(b) that he is in the family or household of the buyer or is a guest
in his home;
(c) that it was reasonable to expect that he might use, consume,
or be affected by the goods; and
(d) that he was injured in person by breach of the warranty.
Even prior to the enactment of the Code, courts were aware of the
harshness of the privity rule in warranty cases where the person in-
jured was one who might reasonably have been expected to use the
product and suffer injuries if it was defective.7 Some courts desiring to
protect the consumer diluted the privity requirement and allowed him
recovery in case of injury. This was especially true in food cases."
While many courts have elected not to formally abandon the privity
requirement, they have employed various legal fictions to bring the
particular cases within the rules of privityY One such fiction was based
on the rule of agency where, for example, the wife-agent purchases
groceries for the husband-principal, who consumes the food and suf-
fers personal injury. The courts have held that the warranty was
actually given to the principal through his agent.' 0 But this legal device
is limited to cases where the "principal" is one who might reasonably
have been foreseen as a user of the goods. Other courts rely instead
upon a theory that once a warranty has been given, it "runs with the
goods," and the consumer, wherever he may be in the chain of dis-
tributions or of subsequent usage, may avail himself of the warranty
attached to the goods." Still other jurisdictions have resorted to a third
party beneficiary theory of recovery, extending the warranty obliga-
tion to others than the purchaser when the defendant-seller may reason-
ably expect the goods to be used by such persons.1 2 However, the use
of legal gymnastics to escape the privity issue was inadequate. It be-
came imperative in drafting the Code to formulate rational rules of
privity applicable in a commercial setting.
Section 2-318 attempted a statement of the law of privity in the
light of moderm commercial practice. One may be skeptical of its suc-
7Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 Fed. 322 (2d Cir. 1912) ; Parks v. C. C. Yost
Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914); Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor,
215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W. 2d 820 (1949).
sKniess v. Armour & Co., 134 Ohio St. 432, 17 N.E. 2d 734 (1938); Jacob E.
Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828 (1942); Klien
v. Duches Sandwich Co., Ltd., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P. 2d 799 (1939).
9 Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927);
Davies v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920).
10 Singer v. Zabelin, 24 N.Y.S. 962 (1941).
1"Williams v. Paducah Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 343 Ill. App. 1, 98 N.E. 2d 164(1951); Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So.
2d 873 (1952).12Mouren v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 139 N.Y.S. 2d 375 (App. Div. 1955).
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cess in this effort. As a practical matter, the inadequacies and contra-
dictions of this section are apparent. What if the defective product
causes harm to a buyer's friend while they are on a picnic? The friend
is not a guest in the buyer's home. What if the party injured is a tenant
in a rooming house? He is not a member of the household. What if the
defective product kills a dog belonging to the buyer's son? This is not
an injury to a person.
Section 2-318 is only beneficial in extending horizontal privity to
a few limited groups now only inadequately reached by evolving case
law; the benefits of the section are far outweighed by its restrictive
drafting as to persons eligible for recovery and the type of compensable
injury.
When the Code was enacted in Wyoming, section 2-318 was amend-
ed to extend a seller's warranties "to any person who may reasonably
be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is
injured by breach of the warranty."' 3 California simply omitted this
section on the ground that it would be a step backward from existing
California law.'"
Because of the restrictiveness of the Code, the court in Yengtzer v.
Taylor Wine Co. 5 was placed in a dilemma. It would either have to
deny recovery or construe an employee to be the principal buyer in
order to reach an equitable decision, even though such construction
was not in harmony with the statutory intent. The court construed the
buyer as defined in section 2-103 of the Code as "a person who buys or
contracts to buy."
Section 2-318 limited the court's discretion by use of a specific
enumeration of categories which have generally been understood to be
exclusive. Courts have held to the strict meaning of the statute where
the case clearly called for a different result. They have concluded that
an automobile is not a home and therefore a guest in a car can not re-
cover in the absence of privity.16 The Pennslyvania court said that an
employee was not within the group to whom the warranty of merchant-
ability extended under section 2-318 and on that basis refused to confer
upon such employee the benefit of the warranty."
It should be noted that section 2-318 takes no position as to the
requirements of vertical privity. Comment 3 states: "Beyond this
[family, household, guest] this section is neutral and is not intended to
enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's war-
ranties, given to the buyer who resells, extend to other persons within
13 Wyo. STAT. ANN. §40A-2-318 (Supp. 1961).
'2 See Senate Fact-Finding Com. of Judiciary, Sixth Progress Report to the
Legislature, pt. 1, Uniform Commercial Code 457-58 (1959-1961).
15414 Pa. 272, 199 A. 2d 463 (1964).
IG Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961).17Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A. 2d 575 (1963).
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the distributive chain." The Code does not purport to affect vertical
privity, but instead leaves the problem to the courts.
Many courts have done away with the requirement of vertical privity
in certain situations.' Courts, when faced with the problem of whether
a manufacturer is liable to a remote vendee or other third persons, state
that there is liability whether or not privity of contract exists. Courts
have done away with vertical privity by judicial decison, and it is be-
lieved that they would have done the same with horizontal privity in
absence of section 2-318.
The rigidity of the statute as presently drafted produces interesting
anomalies. For example, Prinsen v. Russos,9 where plaintiff (a travel-
ing companion of the purchaser of an infected ham sandwich) failed
for want of privity to recover from the seller, has been criticized for
many years as unjust; yet the decision would presumably not be changed
under the presently drafted section 2-318. One cannot help but con-
clude that the statutory drafting of section 2-318 was not in harmony
with developing case lav throughout the country. The Wyoming legisla-
tive decision to broaden the Code to include all people reasonably ex-
pected to use the goods seems sound in that it clearly delineates a
definite policy decision abolishing privity as a requirement. To enact a
statute which must rely on a case by case approach defeats the intent
of the Code. The Code should present to the community a clear and
lucid statement of the law in order to avoid any undue litigation.
JEREmiAH HEGARTY
Joint Tenancy: Partition and Dower-Martin and Stella Jezo
had been married for forty-two years when Martin filed an action for
legal separation and division of the estate, and Stella counterclaimed
for legal separation. Both causes of action were dismissed on the trial
court's finding of condonation, but Martin was given leave to amend
his complaint to seek partition of jointly owned assets in land and joint
bank accounts valued at $430,000. In that complaint, Martin alleged as
follows:
The plaintiff contributed approximately 80% toward the acqui-
sition of the foregoing described property and real estate, and
the defendant contributed approximately 20% thereof. The title
to such property was placed in joint name for purposes of con-
venience and was not intended to transfer actual ownership.
The division of ownership should be in proportion to the con-
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.F. 2d 612
(1958); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. 2d 409 (1932);
Foley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 215 S.W. 2d 314 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1948).
19 194 Wis. 142, 215 N.W. 905 (1927).
19641
